We show how a (big) PEZ dispenser can be used by two or more players to compute a function of their inputs while hiding the values of the inputs from each other. In contrast to traditional approaches for solving this problem, ours does not require any use of randomness.
Introduction
The story. Consider a group of kids who wish to vote between two candidates without revealing anything except the final outcome. To their aid is a PEZ dispenser, which may be pre-loaded with some publicly known sequence of red and yellow candies. 1 The kids take turns, where in each turn one of the kids, based on her vote, decides how many candies to pop out of the dispenser. (No other kid can see the number or the colors of these candies; neither can a kid weigh the dispenser and deduce the number of remaining candies.) The pre-loaded color sequence and the kids' instructions must be arranged so that: (1) at the end of the above process, the color of the candy at the top of the dispenser corresponds to the correct majority vote; (2) no kid can tell anything about the remaining kids' votes from the colors of the candies she took out of the dispenser. The voting process is completed by having one of the kids pop an additional candy and announce its color. The above two requirements guarantee that only the correct outcome is learned.
The problem. A more general and precise formulation of the problem is the following. There are n deterministic players P 1 , . . . , P n , where n ≥ 2. Each player P i holds an input x i ∈ Σ, and together they wish to compute some function f : Σ n → Γ of their inputs while hiding their inputs from each other. The players are assumed to be honest-but-curious: they follow their instructions, but may try Recreational cryptography. Our problem is best viewed as a mathematical game, and more specifically as a "recreational cryptography" problem. By this we mean that we are mainly motivated by its sheer aesthetic qualities and are not aware of any real-world application of any sort. 4 Saying that, however, mathematical games can still yield interesting insights and techniques that might be employed in other contexts, as well as a conceptual understanding of the underlying problems. Indeed, several recreational cryptography problems have already attracted a significant amount of interest. Examples include Visual Cryptography, introduced by Naor and Shamir [10] , cryptographic protocols based on a deal of cards, studied by Fischer and Wright [6] , Crépeau and Kilian [4] and others, and the study of various approaches for comparing values without revealing them [5] . For additional recreational cryptography work see [9] and references therein. Similarly to the above works, we also suggest a physically realizable implementation of a cryptographic primitive. In contrast, however, our implementation does not require any use of randomness.
Secure multiparty computation. The PEZ model may be viewed as a specific model for secure computation. While our problem is very different in nature from the mainstream line of work in this area, initiated in [12, 7, 2, 3] , it is still instructive to put it in this more general context. The original motivation of our research was a study of the power of trusted parties in secure protocols in general, and in particular in the context of the amount of randomness used by the players. In what follows, we explain how the PEZ problem is related to these issues. It is well known that (without a trusted party) randomness is essential for secure computation (see, e.g., [8] ). Obviously, when a trusted party is available, there is a simple deterministic solution to the problem: each player sends its input to the trusted party, who computes the desired value f (x) by itself and announces the result. This solution, however, puts all the computational burden on the trusted party and so the question is raised whether a similar deterministic solution is still possible using a weaker trusted party. The main conclusion of our work is a surprising affirmative answer to an instance of this question: even a severely handicapped, physically realizable, and inherently "leaky" trusted party (as the one described above) allows nontrivial deterministic secure computation.
Two examples. As a first and simple example of a private PEZ protocol, consider the following protocol for the function AND n : {0, 1} n → {0, 1}, computing the product of the n input bits. We use the initial string
Each player P i in its turn reads a single bit of α if its input x i is 1 and otherwise it reads nothing. It is clear that if all players have the input 1 (i.e., AND n (x) = 1) then the output will be 1, whereas otherwise the output will be 0. Moreover, each player when reading a bit from the string α always gets the bit 0 (independently of the inputs of other players) and hence privacy is maintained. In general, however, things are not as simple. For most functions it is not easy to find PEZ protocols and it does not even seem clear that such protocols exist. This is the case also for some very simple functions. As a second example, let MAJ 3 be the majority function on n = 3 bits. Figure 1 describes a private PEZ protocol for this function that uses the 13-bit string α = 1001010010101 and has 7 moves. 5 It can be manually verified that for each of the 8 possible inputs in {0, 1} 3 , the substring of α that is supposed to be read in each move is consistent with the number of bits read in previous moves, and that the protocol has the correct output on each input.
Our results. We begin by studying the class of one-round PEZ protocols, i.e., protocols in which each player makes at most one move (according to some predetermined order). We show that the functions computable by these protocols are exactly those admitting a decision list representation. Consequently, even simple functions such as the exclusive-or of two bits cannot be computed by a one-round private PEZ protocol. We then proceed to show our main result: if no restriction on the #bits read #bits read substring read substring read Move Player on input 0 on input 1 on input 0 on input 1 1
Figure 1: A private PEZ protocol for MAJ 3 using initial string α = 1001010010101 number of moves is made, then, quite surprisingly, every function can be computed by a private PEZ protocol.
The length of the initial string α used by our general construction is doubly exponential in the number of players n, while that of the protocols for decision lists is "only" exponential. Hence, these constructions are feasible only when n is small. It is important to note in this context that even without the privacy requirement, most functions f (even explicit and simple ones) require exponential string length. 6 Organization. The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we formally define the model and study some of its basic properties. Section 3 studies the power of one-round protocols, and Section 4 includes our general construction. In Section 5 we mention some open problems. Finally, Appendix A discusses some issues related to the robustness of the PEZ model.
Preliminaries
In this section we define the private PEZ model and prove two basic closure properties which will be useful in the sequel. Some natural variants of the model are discussed in Appendix A.
Definitions
We start by formally defining the PEZ model and some notation related to PEZ protocols. Definition 1 A PEZ protocol Π for a function f : Σ n → Γ is defined by an initial string α ∈ Γ * and a sequence of m moves (M 1 , . . . , M m ). Each move M j consists of a pair (i j , µ j ), where i j is a player index (between 1 and n) and µ j : Σ → {0, 1, . . . , |α| − 1} specifies the number of symbols to read, for each possible value σ ∈ Σ that input x i j may have. We will refer to the index sequence i 1 , i 2 , . . . , i m as the move order of Π. We assume that for any x ∈ Σ n , m j=1 µ j (x i j ) < |α| (so that the PEZ dispenser never becomes empty during the execution of a protocol). A protocol Π as above is said to privately 6 A large class of Boolean functions requiring exponential complexity in the non-private PEZ model can be obtained by communication complexity arguments. Using different arguments, we show in Section 3 a simple decision list for which the exponential complexity of our protocol is provably optimal (again, even without the privacy requirement). This should be contrasted with the class of symmetric functions, which do admit efficient protocols in the non-private model. compute f if there exists a mapping β : [m] × Σ → Γ * (specifying the string read in each move on each possible input), such that:
For any
where • denotes string concatenation and A B signifies that the string A is a prefix of the string B.
We note that Definition 1 is somewhat redundant, in the sense that the strings β(j, σ) are uniquely defined by α and the moves M j . Conversely, the function β and the move order i 1 , . . . , i m alone are sufficient to uniquely define a protocol Π computing f . However, the above form of the definition will be convenient for our purposes.
Complexity. With a PEZ protocol Π we associate two complexity measures: its string length, denoted by length(Π) and defined as |α| (the number of symbols in α), and the number of moves m, denoted by moves(Π). We say that Π is a one-round protocol if each player makes at most one move.
Two Closure Properties
Towards understanding the power of PEZ computation, it is natural to ask whether a protocol computing a function f can be efficiently converted into protocols for related functions f ′ . We show two simple transformations that may be applied to arbitrary PEZ protocols, preserving their privacy and complexity. The first transformation allows to manipulate the output of a PEZ protocol.
Lemma 2 (Output substitution lemma) Let Π be a private PEZ protocol computing f : Σ n → Γ, and let g : Γ → Γ ′ be an arbitrary symbol substitution function. Then, there is a private PEZ protocol Π ′ computing the function f ′ (x) def = g(f (x)) with length(Π ′ ) ≤ length(Π) and moves(Π ′ ) ≤ moves(Π).
Proof:
A protocol Π ′ as required may be obtained from Π by applying the output substitution g to each symbol of α. It is easy to see that the new protocol correctly computes f ′ and that the privacy of Π is not violated by the symbol substitution.
In the case of Boolean functions (Γ = {0, 1}), Lemma 2 implies that computing a function in the PEZ model is as hard as computing its negation. A somewhat more surprising corollary is that the input concatenation function is the hardest to compute in the PEZ model. More precisely:
Corollary 3 Suppose that Π IC computes the input concatenation function over Σ (that is, the function IC which maps n symbols from Σ to the symbol from Σ n corresponding to their concatenation). Then, for every output alphabet Γ and every function f : Σ n → Γ there is a PEZ protocol Π f computing f with length(Π f ) ≤ length(Π IC ) and moves(Π f ) ≤ moves(Π IC ). 7 The second transformation, described next, allows to manipulate the inputs to a PEZ protocol in a restricted way.
Lemma 4 (Projection lemma) Let Π be a private PEZ protocol computing f : Σ n → Γ. Let φ : (Σ ′ ) n ′ → Σ n be such that each of the n outputs of φ depends on at most a single input, and let
Then, there is a PEZ protocol Π ′ computing f ′ with length(Π ′ ) ≤ length(Π) and moves(Π ′ ) ≤ moves(Π).
Proof sketch:
The idea is to let each player in Π ′ simulate the players in Π whose outputs of φ are affected by its input. Formally, let Π = (α,
as required may be defined as follows. The initial string α ′ is equal to α. For each move M j = (i j , µ j ), let i ′ j be the index of the input of φ on which the i j -th output of φ depends (or 1 if the i j -th output is a constant), and let φ i j : Σ ′ → Σ be a mapping defining the i j -th output of φ as a function of its
In the case of a binary input alphabet, Lemma 4 allows to restrict input variables, permute them, and replace variables by their negations. Moreover, Lemma 4 implies that, in some sense, it suffices to consider functions and protocols over a binary input alphabet. This is formalized by the following corollary.
Corollary 5 Let f : Σ n → Γ be a function over an arbitrary alphabet Σ, and let k = ⌈log 2 |Σ|⌉. Let E : Σ → {0, 1} k be a bijection, mapping each symbol in Σ to a distinct binary string. Let f ′ : {0, 1} nk → Γ be the translation of f to a binary alphabet, i.e., f ′ is such that
Then, any protocol Π ′ computing f ′ can be converted into a protocol Π computing f such that length(Π) ≤ length(Π ′ ) and moves(Π) ≤ moves(Π ′ ).
Proof:
The protocol Π is obtained by applying Lemma 4 with φ(
One-Round PEZ Protocols
In this section we attempt to answer the following questions: (1) which functions can be computed by a one-round private PEZ protocol? and (2) what is the cost (in terms of string length) required by such a computation? We start by defining the decision list computational model. Definition 6 A decision list with input alphabet Σ and output alphabet Γ is defined by a list
where each i j ∈ [n] is an index of an input variable, each D j : Σ → Γ ∪ {⊥} decides, based on x i j , whether to output a specified value or to continue, and def ∈ Γ is a default output value. The value L(x) computed by L on input x is the output of the following program:
We refer to ℓ as the length of L. We say that L is read-once if each input variable x i appears at most once in L.
Note that in the case of a binary input alphabet, any decision list L can be assumed to be read-once (otherwise there exists a shorter decision list L ′ computing the same function). However, this is not true for general input alphabets. 8 We now show that any read-once decision list can be computed by a one-round protocol. We start with the following composition lemma.
Lemma 7 Let Π be a private PEZ protocol computing f : Σ n → Γ with an initial string α of length l and with move order i 1 , i 2 , . . . , i m (i.e., player i 1 plays in move 1, i 2 in move 2, etc.). For i ∈ [n] and
Then, f D,i admits a protocol Π ′ with string length |D(Σ)| · l and player move order i 1 , i 2 , . . . , i m , i.
Proof:
We may assume that ⊥∈ D(Σ): otherwise f D,i depends only on x i , in which case the lemma easily follows. Let D(Σ) = {⊥, γ 0 , . . . , γ k−1 }, and let
A protocol Π ′ as required can be constructed as follows. Its initial string α ′ is defined by
The move structure of Π ′ is as follows. First, the m moves of Π are executed, where the number of symbols read at each move is multiplied by k + 1. By the correctness of Π, at the end of these moves the first k + 1 unread symbols of α are γ • f (x). In the final move of Π ′ , player
Thus, the output of Π ′ is equal to f (x) if D(x i ) =⊥ and is equal to D(x i ) otherwise. The privacy of Π ′ follows from the privacy of Π and from the fact that the additional symbols read by P i in the last move are determined by
, def be a read-once decision list with input alphabet Σ and output alphabet Γ. Then, L can be computed by a one-round private PEZ protocol with move order i ℓ , i ℓ−1 , . . . , i 1 and string length k ℓ , where k = min(|Σ|, |Γ| + 1).
We use induction on ℓ. If ℓ = 0, then L = def computes a constant function, which admits a trivial one-round protocol with string length 1 and no moves. Now, consider a length-ℓ read-
To get a complete characterization of the class of functions computable by one-round protocols, we prove the following converse of Theorem 8.
8 Corollary 5 reduces the task of computing a general function f to that of computing a function f ′ over a binary input alphabet. However, it does not guarantee that if f can be computed in one round then so can f ′ . We will therefore address the general case in this section.
Theorem 9 Suppose that f : Σ n → Γ can be computed by a one-round private PEZ protocol. Then, f can be computed by a read-once decision list.
We prove by induction on m that if f is computed by an m-move one-round protocol Π, then f can also be computed by a read-once decision list L Π of length m whose variables correspond to the active players in Π. If m = 0, then f is a constant function, which can be computed by a length-0 decision list. Now, suppose that f is computed by an m-move one-round protocol Π with move order i 1 , . . . , i m and last move M m = (i m , µ m ). We will use this last move to define the first decision of L Π .
Let k = max(µ m (Σ)), and letσ ∈ Σ be some symbol on which this maximum is attained (that is, x im =σ maximizes the number of symbols read by P im on move m). Let f ′ denote the function f restricted by x im =σ. The correctness of Π implies that the same f ′ is obtained ifσ is replaced by any otherσ ′ such that µ m (σ ′ ) = k. Let β be as promised in Definition 1, i.e., β(j, σ) is the substring of α read on move j when x i j = σ, and let γ = β(m,σ). We define a function D : Σ → Γ ∪ {⊥} as follows:
We will now argue that for any x ∈ Σ n ,
Let σ = x im . It follows directly from the definition of
. By Eq. (1) we have:
Letting x ′ be the input obtained from x by changing position i m toσ, we also have:
From (3), (4) , and the fact that β(m, σ) < k = |γ|, we may conclude that
implying that f (x) = γ |β(m,σ)|+1 , as required. Finally, observe that the restriction f ′ can be privately computed by a protocol Π ′ with move order i 1 , . . . , i m−1 . Such a Π ′ can be obtained from Π by letting P i m−1 play the role of P im on input σ. Formally, the first m − 2 moves of Π ′ are as in Π, and its last move is (i m−1 , µ m−1 + k). By the induction's hypothesis, f ′ admits a read-once decision list L Π ′ over the variables i 1 , . . .
is a read-once decision list for f over the variables i 1 , . . . , i m , as required.
Theorem 9 shows that privacy comes at a price. Indeed, while any function can be computed in one round in the non-private variant of the PEZ model, for most functions this is not the case in the private model. The simplest example of a function which cannot be computed by a decision list is the exclusive-or of 2 bits. In the next section we will see that 3 moves ("a round and a half") are already sufficient to privately compute this function.
Combining Theorems 8, 9, we get:
Corollary 10 A function f : Σ n → Γ admits a one-round private PEZ protocol if and only if it can be computed by a read-once decision list.
We conclude this section with a brief discussion of the string length of decision lists in the PEZ model. The upper bound given by Theorem 8 is exponential in the decision list length. While it is possible to do much better for some special classes of decision lists (generalizing the AND n example from the introduction), we show that this is not the case in general.
Theorem 11 Let L = (1, D 1 ), (2, D 2 ) , . . . , (n, D n ), n + 1 be a decision list over input alphabet Σ = {0, 1} and output alphabet Γ = [n + 1], such that D i (0) =⊥ and D i (1) = i for 1 ≤ i ≤ n (i.e., L outputs the first index where the input is non-zero or n + 1 if no such index exists). Then, even if the privacy requirement is dropped, the string length of every PEZ protocol computing L is at least 2 n + 1.
Proof: Let Π be a correct (but not necessarily private) PEZ protocol for L, and for x ∈ {0, 1} n let w x be the total number of symbols read on input x. Assume towards a contradiction that length(Π) ≤ 2 n . It follows that w x < 2 n for every x, and so there must exist distinct x ′ , x ′′ such that w x ′ = w x ′′ . Moreover, we can assume that there is no position i such that x ′ i = x ′′ i = 1; otherwise, both x and x ′ can be changed to 0 in every such position i without violating the equality w x ′ = w x ′′ . But this implies that L(x ′ ) = L(x ′′ ), since the smallest position i such that x ′ i = 1 must differ from the smallest position i such that x ′′ i = 1. This contradicts the assumption that w x ′ = w x ′′ .
A General Construction
The goal of this section is to construct a private PEZ protocol for every function f : Σ n → Γ. By Corollary 5, we may restrict our attention to the case of a binary input alphabet. Furthermore, by Corollary 3 it suffices to specifically consider the input concatenation function IC : {0, 1} n → {0, 1} n . Our construction may indeed be viewed as applying to this specific function. However, to make its presentation more explicit we will directly apply our construction to a general function f : {0, 1} n → Γ.
Notation. Throughout this section, we will index the players and the input variables by 0, 1, . . . , n−1 (rather than 1, 2, . . . , n). For an integer m, the ith bit of m is the coefficient of 2 i in the binary expansion of m. We will view an input x as an integer, between 0 and 2 n − 1, where the input of P i is the ith bit of (the integer) x. Before describing our general construction we will need the following two definitions.
Definition 12
For any non-negative integer j, define the level of j to be the number of consecutive 1s that appear at the end of the binary expansion of j. This is the unique non-negative integer i such that j ≡ 2 i − 1 (mod 2 i+1 ).
Definition 13 For any non-negative integers x and j we say that x allows j if j is of level i and the ith bit of x is 1 (in other words, x mod 2 i+1 ≥ 2 i ). That is, the binary expansion of x contains 1 in the position corresponding to the rightmost 0 of the binary expansion of j.
We are now ready to describe our protocol. Consider an arbitrary function f : {0, 1} n → Γ. We define a protocol Π as follows. The protocol has 2 n − 1 moves, which are executed in descending order: (M 2 n −2 , M 2 n −3 , . . . , M 0 ). Move M j is played by player P i j , where i j is defined as the level of j. The initial string is defined as α def = S(2 n − 1), where the function S(·) (induced by f ) will be defined below. In move M j , player P i j will read nothing if x i j = 0, or |S(j)| bits if x i j = 1. In the latter case, S(j) is the string which P i j will expect to read in Move M j . 9 Definition 14 For any non-negative integer x, define S(x) recursively as follows:
(a) S(0) = f (0); (b) for x > 0, S(x) is the concatenation of those S(j) (in decreasing order of indices), where j < x and x allows j, followed by the symbol f (x).
Examples: Here are the first values of S(·):
In order to show the correctness of our construction we need two additional definitions.
Definition 15 For any non-negative integers x and c, B(x, c) is the concatenation of those S(j) (in decreasing order of indices) where x allows j and j < c.
Lemma 16 B(x, c) is the substring of α that (according to the players' expectations) will be read after Move M c under the input x.
Proof:
Consider Move M j for some j < c. This move is played by P i , where i is the level of j. By Definition 13, x allows j iff the ith bit of x, or P i 's input, is 1. It follows from the description of Π that the substring S(j) will be read at Move M j iff x allows j.
Definition 17 For any non-negative integers x and c, we write x ⊆ c if every bit in the binary expansion of c is no less than the corresponding bit in x. (In other words, the set naturally encoded by x is a subset of the set encoded by c.) We write x ⊂ c if x ⊆ c and x = c.
Observe that x ⊆ c implies x ≤ c. Before we can prove our main results, we need another technical lemma.
Lemma 18 If x ⊂ c, then there is a k such that x ≤ k < c, k is allowed by c, and k is not allowed by x.
Let i be one of the integers such that the ith bit of c is 1 and the ith bit of x is 0. Then c mod 2 i+1 ≥ 2 i and x mod 2 i+1 < 2 i , thus there is at least one integer k in the range x ≤ k < c such that k ≡ 2 i − 1 (mod 2 i+1 ). This k is allowed by c, but not by x.
Our main theorem is the following:
Theorem 19 For any non-negative integers x and c, x ⊆ c implies that
This proof proceeds by induction on c − x ≥ 0. The statement is true by definition if c = x:
Let us now consider x ⊂ c. By Lemma 18, there exist k such that x ≤ k < c and k is allowed by c but not by x. Let k 0 be the largest such k.
Since the string S(c) does not occur in the definition of B(x, c), the strings defining S(c) and B(x, c) match up exactly up till S(k 0 ) occurs in S(c), but not in B(x, c). Thus, in order to prove the theorem, it suffices to show that B(x, k 0 ) • f (x) S(k 0 ). Since k 0 is smaller than c, this would follow by induction, if it could be established that x ⊆ k 0 .
Let i be the level of k 0 . Then k 0 is the largest integer of level i that is no greater than c (otherwise, that bigger number would have been selected as k 0 ). Since k 0 mod 2 i+1 = 2 i − 1 and c mod 2 i+1 ≥ 2 i , the binary digits in k 0 and c that correspond to powers of 2 over 2 i are equal. (Thus they dominate the corresponding bits of x.) The ith bit of x is 0, since x does not allow k 0 . Thus there is no condition on the corresponding bit in k 0 . 10 Finally, the bits in k 0 that correspond to powers of 2 below 2 i are all 1, thus dominating whatever bits x might have there.
Substituting c = 2 n − 1 into Theorem 19, we obtain the following corollary, which establishes the correctness of our protocol.
Corollary 20 For any input
Since α = S(2 n − 1) and (by Lemma 16) B(x, 2 n − 1) is the prefix of α expected to be read on input x, this means that our substrings S(j) are consistent with α and f .
For a crude analysis of length(Π), note that |S(j)| = O(j!), implying that length(Π) = O(2 n !) = 2 2Õ (n) . We conclude this section with the following theorem:
Theorem 21 Any function f : {0, 1} n → Γ admits a private PEZ protocol with 2 n − 1 moves and string length 2 2Õ (n) .
Open Questions
Having established the universality of private PEZ computation, it remains to better understand its complexity. Some of the more interesting open questions are:
• What are the minimal string length and number of moves required for computing the worst functions? Note that, by Corollary 3, it suffices to consider the input concatenation function. Our general upper bound leaves room for an exponential improvement.
• Do the answers to the above question change if one considers natural special classes of functions, such as (from large to small): (1) Boolean functions, (2) symmetric functions, or (3) threshold functions? Note that for classes (2) and (3) there seems to be no inherent reason precluding protocols with poly(n) string length. Moreover, the specific protocol for MAJ 3 described in Figure 1 provides some positive evidence: its string length is 13, in comparison to 72 in the general construction for n = 3.
General privacy thresholds. In our definition, as described in the Introduction, we require that no subset of players can learn information about the inputs of other players from the substrings of α which they read. A natural relaxation is a t-privacy requirement, which should hold only for subsets of at most t players. However, since our model is deterministic, the weakest requirement of 1-privacy is already sufficient to imply our default requirement of n-privacy.
Adaptivity and additional communication. Our definition requires players to be non-adaptive: their choice of how many symbols to read cannot depend on what they have previously seen. However, since by our privacy requirement the bits read by P i depend only on x i , the notion of adaptivity becomes void. Similarly, allowing the players to directly communicate with each other over private channels would not have made a difference (unless randomization is allowed). These issues will be later revisited.
Incorporating multi-output functionalities. As far as our definitions are concerned, the execution of a PEZ protocol ends when the first unread symbol is the output of the computation. The issue of how this output is learned by the players (e.g., by having one of the players read it and announce it to the other players) is external to our model. For this reason, we also do not explicitly specify who should learn the final output: whether it should be learned by all players, by some strict subset of the players, or by an external party. An even more general specification of a functionality f to be computed by the protocol can assign an arbitrary function of the input x to each player. We now show how to naturally incorporate an output-learning stage in our model, such that computing an arbitrary multi-output functionality f : Σ n → Γ n in the new model reduces to computing some related single-output functionality f ′ in the original model. In the new model (which incorporates output learning), a special output round is added to the end of the protocol, where each player reads one symbol. The symbol read by P i at the output round should be equal to its output. The privacy requirement remains unchanged: players should learn nothing until the output round (a modification of this requirement is discussed in the next paragraph). To implement f in the new model, let f ′ be a single-output function whose single output is a concatenation of the n outputs of f (so that the output alphabet of f ′ is Γ ′ = Γ n . Now, suppose that Π ′ computes f ′ in the standard model, with initial string α ′ . A protocol Π computing f in the new model may proceed as follows. The output alphabet of Π is Γ. Its string α will be the natural length-n|α| conversion of α ′ to the alphabet Γ. The moves of Π will be the same as in Π ′ , except that the number of bits read in each move is multiplied by n. Finally, at the output round, each player in its turn reads a single symbol. The protocol Π clearly computes f , and its privacy follows from that of Π ′ .
Allowing players to learn the function value. In our definition we make the strongest privacy requirement possible: no player or set of players is allowed to learn any information, even if such information would follow from the output of the function. This convention has several important advantages, most notably the fact that it allows various manipulations of the protocols (see, e.g., Lemma 2). But it is still natural to ask how the power of the model would change if we allow the players to learn information that follows from their inputs and the value of the function f . (We are assuming here that the value of f should be learned by all players; however, a similar discussion applies to general functionalities.) For this modification of the model, it is not clear that its power remains the same. For instance, computing the function XOR n (exclusive-or of n bits) in the more liberal model efficiently reduces to computing the function XOR n−1 in the original model, which may as well be a significantly easier task. However, the extra power of the more liberal model does not extend much farther than that. Specifically, consider a Boolean function f . We argue that from a protocol for f in the liberal model, one can get a protocol in the standard model for any function f ′ obtained by restricting a single variable of f . Indeed, let f ′ denote the function f with x i restricted to some value c. A standard protocol for f ′ can be obtained by simulating the liberal model with the value of P i fixed to c. By the (relaxed) privacy requirement of the protocol for f , player P i should see at most two possible transcripts: one for all inputs x such that x i = c and f (x) = c, and one for all x such that x i = c and f (x) = 1. If these two transcripts are identical, then the protocol already satisfies the default privacy requirement. Otherwise, the protocol can be truncated just before the first point of difference, resulting (again) in a protocol for f ′ in the standard model. A similar argument applies even if the model is further relaxed by adding adaptivity and direct communication between players. 11
A physically motivated variant. In the physical PEZ model we assume that it is impossible for a player to see anything but the candies it takes out of the dispenser. In practice, however, additional one or two candies can be seen. This concern also arises when physically implementing PEZ protocols using a deck of cards, where the card at the bottom of the deck is the analogue of the candy at the top of the dispenser. A private PEZ protocol in our setting can be converted into a private PEZ protocol in this more leaky setting by inserting a small number of "dummy" candies, of some default color, between any two original candies.
A.2 "Uninteresting" Variants
We now discuss some modifications of the default PEZ model which make it either useless or essentially equivalent to other standard models.
Randomized PEZ. A seemingly interesting modification of the PEZ model allows the initial string α to be randomized. (This also allows to simulate private sources of randomness.) The adaptive version of this model is very powerful, since it allows to privately distribute arbitrarily correlated random resources to the players. Such resources can be used, for instance, as one-time pads for performing subsequent oblivious transfer protocols [1, 11] , which in turn can be used for privately computing any circuit of size s with an initial string of length O(n 2 s). However, this model is not very interesting, in the sense that it is equivalent to standard secure computation with initialization by a trusted party. Indeed, the "interactive" functionality of the PEZ dispenser can be simulated in the latter model using standard general techniques for secure computation.
Malicious PEZ. Throughout this work, we assume that the players are honest-but-curious. It is not hard to see that there is not much to do against malicious players (if all other aspects of the definition remain the same). For instance, the player who makes the second move can attempt to read all the remainder of α and see how many symbols the first player took.
Non-private PEZ. We already mentioned in the introduction the non-private version of the PEZ model and showed how any function can be easily implemented in that model (by implementing its truth-table). Besides being unrelated to cryptography, this model also is not very interesting from a complexity theoretic point of view. Moreover, by allowing this model to be adaptive, it becomes as strong as the general communication complexity model (where the PEZ dispenser can be used to implement communication between parties).
